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FROM A MATHEMATICS OF NECESSITY 
TO A MATHEMATICS OF CONVENTION 
Pieranna Garavaso 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588 
In Wittgenstein's speculation the transition from the philosophical 
point of view expressed in the Tractatus logico-philosophicus to the 
later development of his thought, as it is reflected in the Philosophical 
investigations and On certainty, is relevant also to his conception of 
mathematics. 
In particular, while in the Tractatus, mathematics is not given an 
account of its own, independent of the account which is given to logic, 
the Rel1Ulrks on the foundations of I1Ulthel1Ultics seems to offer suf-
ficient evidence for the belief that, in the late stage of Wittgenstein's 
speculation, the analysis of the foundations of mathematics received an 
explicit treatment on its own. 
This discussion is concerned with the attempt to illustrate the 
transformation which occurred in Wittgenstein's way of conceiving 
mathematics; that is to say, with the passage from the original idea of 
mathematics as a discipline, on a par with logic itself, reflecting the un-
modifiable, and therefore necessary, features of the logical structure of 
the world, to the more "intuitionistic" conception of mathematics, as a 
constructive activity, leading to merely conventional truths. 
The different connotations of the notion of "truth," in relation 
to these two different conceptions of mathematics, are also considered. 
t t t 
The purpose of this paper is to sketch some features of 
the development and transformation ofWittgenstein's account 
of mathematics and mathematical truth from his first work 
(Wittgenstein, 1922) to the later development of his thought 
(Wittgenstein, 1956). 
Let us start directly in outlining those main features of 
Wittgenstein's early conception of mathematics in such a way 
that, in the end, we will have the ground that we need for the 
comparison with the later view. 
Three aspects will be addressed: (1) the form of mathe-
matical propositions, (2) the relation between logic and 
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mathematics, and (3) the character of necessity of mathe-
matical truth. 
The transition from the claim, "The propositions of logic 
are tautologies," to the remark, "Logic is not a body of doc-
trine, but a mirror-image of the world. Logic is transcenden-
tal," is significant. 
In the following passage, both the link and the differ-
entiation between logic and mathematics can be found. 
The assertion that "Mathematics is a logical method" de-
fines the link, but already suggests a differentiation. "The 
propositions of mathematics are equations, and therefore 
pseUdo-propositions" specifies the difference, without deny-
ing kinship. 
Logical propositions cannot be regarded as standardly 
meaningful propositions, such as those of the natural sciences. 
The characterization of logical propositions as tautologies, i. e., 
as propositions which say nothing because of their being 
"unconditionally true," and therefore, such as to admit "all 
possible situations," attributes to them "a unique status 
among all propositions" (Wittgenstein, 1922:69 and 121). 
The truth-table method that allows the determination of 
the truth-value of complex propositions through knowledge 
of the truth-values of the elementary propositions with which 
they are constructed (Wittgenstein, 1922:73), and therefore 
theoretically succeeds in reducing the question of the truth-
value of propositions to the empirically verifiable correspon-
dence between states of affairs, actually existing in the world, 
and elementary propositions picturing them, brings into evi-
dence the peculiarity of tautologies as propositions always 
true, regardless of the truth-values of their truth-functional 
components (Wittgenstein, 1922:69 and 121). 
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What about mathematical propositions? They are not 
tautologies, since they are not discovered to be "uncondi-
tionally true" independently of the truth of their truth-
functional components. The peculiarity that makes them 
pseudo-propositions is, as in the case of logical propositions, a 
certain lacking of any "content." There is nothing comparable 
to what the pictured state of affairs represents for a proposi-
tion of the natural sciences. 
The assertion that "A proposition of mathematics does 
not express a thought" (Wittgenstein, 1922: 133) is a denial of 
any representational content in a mathematical proposition. 
Since "A thought is a proposition with a sense" (Wittgenstein, 
1922:35) and "A proposition [it can be presupposed that here 
Wittgenstein was thinking of a 'proposition with a sense'] 
is a picture of reality" (Wittgenstein, 1922:39), and since 
"Instead of 'This proposition has such and such a sense' we 
can simply say 'This proposition represents such and such 
situation'" (Wittgenstein, 1922:43), it follows that a mathe-
matical proposition does not represent any situation, i.e., is 
not a picture of reality. 
This lack of a "sinn" of mathematical propositions is 
shown in their form itself, since, because they are equations, 
they are pseUdo-propositions (Wittgenstein, 1922: 133). 
Before advancing the analysis of the form of the equa-
tion, a too hastily formed conclusion that could be derived 
from the account of the senselessness of mathematical, and 
more generally, logical propositions, namely their absolute 
meaninglessness or uselessness is questioned. 
It is essential to stress that for Wittgenstein to say that 
logical and mathematical propositions have no sense (they are 
"sinnlos") is not the same as saying that they are nonsensical 
("unsinnig'); as clearly stated in the propositions above men-
tioned, "sinn" is had only by propositions of natural sciences. 
The fact that logical and mathematical propositions lack it 
does not suffice to make them "unsinnig"-as for example 
philosophical propositions are (Wittgenstein, 1922:37). 
This relevant difference cannot be justified unless the 
denial of sense of logical and mathematical propositions is not 
meant as equivalent to a denial of relevance or worth. Logical 
and mathematical propositions are not queer mixtures of signs; 
on the contrary, they perform the role of showing the logical 
structure of the world: "The logic of the world, which is 
shown in tautologies by the propositions of logic, is shown in 
equations by mathematics" (Wittgenstein, 1922: 133). 
Therefore, in order to explain both their emptiness and 
their function, it could be said that they have not a subject 
matter in the way in which empirical propositions do (Wittgen-
stein, 1922: 129), or that the relation between a logical propo-
sition and what is shown by it is different from the relation 
between empirical propositions and their subject matter. 
Empirical propositions picture their subject matter; 
logical propositions show what only improperly can be called 
their subject matter, "the logic of the world." 
Hence, the "unique status" of logical and mathematical 
propositions is not due merely to lack of sense or to a differ-
ence of subject matter in comparison with empirical proposi-
tions; rather, their status can be understood only by taking 
into consideration how these two types of propositions refer 
to the world, and this is primarily reflected in their form. 
Mathematical propositions are all of the form a=a, or a=b. 
But, it is not the case that the supposed identity of reference 
of the two expressions on the two sides of the equality is 
asserted by the equation. Rather, the contrary is true: The 
equation can be written because of the already known iden-
tity of the two expressions (Wittgenstein, 1922: 135 and 134). 
What is stated, by asserting the identity of the two signs/ 
symbols or expressions, is their capability of being substituted 
for one another. Therefore, for this reason, equations are in a 
certain way superfluous: " ... the essential point about an 
equation is that it is not necessary in order to show that the 
two expressions connected by the sign of equality have the 
same meaning, since this can be seen from the two expres-
sions themselves" (Wittgenstein, 1922:133). 
The sign of identity cannot establish or produce the 
equivalence of the two expressions it unites, but on the con-
trary only because the two expressions have already been 
known to be equivalent, can the sign of identity be employed. 
It really seems that there are only two alternatives with 
regard to the use of this sign: either it can be eliminated from 
our language (Wittgenstein, 1922:105), because the identity 
or the difference of objects is to be resolved by the mere 
identity or difference of signs denoting the objects, or its 
relevance has to be seen not in its power of equating two 
different expressions-since, were the equivalence of the two 
expressions not yet known, the sign of identity itself could 
not be used - but in being the instrument through which some, 
in a certain way useful, transitions from a set of expressions 
to another set of different expressions can be performed. 
Being an equation is not something accidental for mathe-
matical propositions: "It is the essential characteristic of 
mathematical method that it employs equations" (Wittgen-
stein, 1922:135). 
Thus, mathematical propositions fall under the second of 
the possible alternatives. They have a function which requires 
their being equations. And since the legitimate use of the sign 
of identity is subsequent to the actual equivalence of the ex-
pressions, mathematical propositions, according to Wittgen-
stein, are not only true, but obviously true. 
Similarly, as already mentioned, logical propositions are 
"unconditionally true." 
Neither in logic nor in mathematics is any mistake or un-
expected discovery possible (Wittgenstein, 1922:95, 133, 
and 129). 
Their validity a priori is connected with the capability of 
conceiving a world: "What makes logic a priori is the impossi-
bility of illogical thought" (Wittgenstein, 1922:95). 
In summary, mathematical and logical propositions are 
similar in the following respects: (1) they share the feature of 
being different from the propositions of natural science: 
neither mathematical nor logical propositions picture facts; 
(2) they both show the logical structure of the world; and (3) 
they are either "obviously" or "unconditionally" true. 
On the other hand, they are different in two says: (1) 
mathematical propositions are equations and not tautologies, 
and (2) their peculiar function is to allow the transition from a 
set of expressions not belonging to mathematics to another set 
of expressions not belonging to mathematics. 
In this paper the early view Wittgenstein (1922) held 
on mathematics will not be criticized. The purpose, rather, 
is to outline a comparison between his earlier and later posi-
tions. 
Nonetheless, some directions along which a critical analy-
sis would be developed are mentioned: 
1. The characterization of mathematical truths as equa-
tions always obviously true does not seem to cover 
the whole field of mathematically true propositions. 
2. The account of identity, which constitutes the basis 
of the early theory of mathematics, leaves unsolved 
the problem of the status of identity itself: its not 
being "an essential constituent of conceptual nota-
tion," if can be understood with regard to the objects, 
whose difference or equality might be solved through 
a less rich and various use of signs, seems to be com-
patible with an account of mathematics as constituted 
only of propositions employing the sign of identity, 
only on the basis of the assumption of an eventual 
total superfluity of mathematics itself. 
3. Finally, the relation between logic and mathematics 
Mathematics of necessity to mathematics of convention 87 
cannot be interpreted as a relation of mere inclusion 
of the second in the first, as a logicist reading of the 
first work (Wittgenstein, 1922) would suggest: some 
difference between the two is stressed and the com-
mon characteristic of showing the logical structure of 
the world is asserted in a rather vague way. 
Let us come back now to the main aim of this exposition. 
It should be clear enough at this point why Wittgenstein's 
early conception of mathematics (1922) is characterized as a 
"mathematics of necessity." 
If that account of mathematics is examined, the idea of a 
presupposed relation of kinship linking logic and mathe-
matics is easily envisioned. One of the essential features that 
distinguishes this relation is the a priori necessary truth of this 
set of propositions. 
Furthermore, their necessity wholly derives from their 
peculiar link to the world, i.e., their lacking any pictorial con-
nection with states of affairs, and their showing the logical 
structure of the world. 
What then is Wittgenstein's (1956) account of mathemati-
cal propositions, of their form, of their relation to logic, and 
finally of their truth in the later development? 
First, there is no explicit restriction of mathematical 
propositions to equations, but despite this the points of con-
tact seem numerous: the examples of mathematical proposi-
tions are generally equations, the discussion related to the 
notion of "calculations" is developed through the presentation 
of equations, and the discussion of the concept of "proof" 
relies again on inferences whose steps are justified on the basis 
of the equivalence of the various lines. 
Furthermore, mathematical propositions are used for the 
transition from sets of true propositions to different sets of 
true propositions. 
Yet despite these similarities with the early writing (Witt-
genstein, 1922), the fact that no restriction on the form of 
mathematical propositions is given is not wholly irrelevant: 
mathematics is "a MOTLEY of techniques of proof," and in 
addition is regarded as not being "a sharply delimited con-
cept"(Wittgenstein, 1956:84eand 155e). 
Perhaps Wittgenstein was still convinced of the pos-
sibility of reducing all mathematical truths to the form of 
equation, but it seems that his first concern was to give the 
most general and comprehensive account of all the various 
branches of this "science" ("bird's eye view"), rather than to 
synthesize most of its features into a small number of char-
acterizations ("the general form of the proposition"). 
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Let us now consider in the second work, what in the first 
seemed to be the central point ofWittgenstein's conception of 
mathematics, namely its relation to logic. 
First, the differentiation of logical and mathematical 
propositions from empirical propositions remains, though the 
grounds of the difference have changed. Wittgenstein's ap-
proach to this topic was on the line of an epistemological 
analysis, i e., he considered the different quality of the cer-
tainty that distinguishes our conviction of a mathematical 
truth from our conviction of an empirical truth. 
The inexorability of mathematical and logical inferences, 
the way that we do not even imagine to call in question the 
certainty of their conclusions, is peculiar to them, strictly con-
nected with their function in our life, and independent of ex-
perience. This, on the contrary, supports the truth of those 
empirical propositions we regard as true (Wittgenstein, 1956: 
24e and 27e): "Why are the Newtonian laws not axioms of 
mathematics? Because we could quite well imagine things being 
otherwise .... A proposition which it is supposed to be possi-
ble to imagine as other than true has a different function from 
one for which this does not hold" (Wittgenstein, 1956: l14e). 
Through the discussion of "experiment" and repeated 
assertion that the result of each mathematical proof is not 
unexpected, Wittgenstein stressed the "fundamental differ-
ence, together with an apparent similarity, between the roles 
of an arithmetical proposition and an empirical proposition" 
(Wittgenstein, 1956:32e). 
In effect, form and empirical content are not features that 
characterize propositions as empirical or non-empirical (Witt-
genstein, 1956:13e and 75e). 
Calculation, the main mathematical activity with which 
Wittgenstein dealt, is not an experiment when it is normally 
performed: there is no expectancy of unpredictable results. 
Yet there may be a situation in which the same expressions 
that in a normal activity of calculating are mathematical ex-
pressions can turn into the steps of an experiment. The anal-
ogy with the action of "lighting the stove in the morning" 
seems very enlightening. Indeed this action is surely per-
formed, under normal circumstances, with a specific purpose, 
but nothing in the action itself can forbid the performance of 
this same action for an experiment. Analogously, calculation 
is normally one of the mathematical activities performed with 
propositions, whose characteristic is that of following certain 
rules in such a way that nothing unexpected, uncertain, or 
ambiguous can result. But, nothing in the propositions rules 
out the possibility of using them with the aim of performing 
an experiment, e.g., when "the teacher makes the pupil do a 
calculation in order to see whether he can calculate" (Wittgen-
stein, 1956:95e, 97e, 98e, and 9ge). 
What is then the root of cogency with which mathemati-
cal proofs, calculations, and measurements convince us of the 
truth of their results? 
The analysis of logical inference reveals both similarity 
and difference between Wittgenstein's early (1922) and late 
(1956) points of view. 
In fact, if on one side mathematics and logic are still 
regarded as fields of linguistic expression in which absolute 
certainty, "peculiar solidity," and "unassailable position," 
are warranted, on the other side is a severe criticism of the 
justification of these characteristics in terms of any metaphy-
sical correspondence with a mysterious structure, essence, or 
truth in reality (Wittgenstein, 1956:5e and 47e). 
In particular, Wittgenstein denied the myth present in his 
first account, namely that "logic is a kind of ultra-physics, the 
description of the 'logical structure' of the world, which we 
perceive through a kind of ultra-experience." 
In opposition to the theory of logic as "showing" the 
necessary a priori structure of the world, and analogously to 
the theory of logic as "grammar," i.e., as the set of rules of 
every language-game connected to a form of life (Wittgenstein, 
1968), in his late account the explanation of the cogency of 
logical inferences, through which mathematical truths are 
derived, is the function that our use of these expressions gave 
to them. 
The starting point is the acknowledgment of mathematics 
as one of the many activities of our life and only from the 
peculiar role it has in our life, does the necessity of logical 
inferences derive (Wittgenstein, 1956:3e and 37e). 
Therefore, the "hardness of the logical must" is wholly 
dependent upon our conventional, agreed conception of what 
line logical thinking should follow; the "inexorability" of logic 
is nothing but the actual fact that we are inexorable in apply-
ing these laws. And this is only because, in our activities, this 
particular way of inferring, counting, and calculating resulted 
to be the most useful, and the fittest to our practical purposes 
(Wittgenstein, 1956:35e, 37e, and I07e). 
A calculation procedure that always gave different results 
in different situations or repetitions of the same calculi, would 
be of less use in our life. 
With the shifting of the foundations of logic and correct-
ness of inferring from the ideal correspondence with the struc-
ture of the world to our practical obedience to the logical 
rules, the notions of truth and of right and wrong change 
deeply: "But is this counting only a use, then; isn't there also 
some truth corresponding to this sequence?" "The truth is 
that counting has proved to pay" "and of course there is such 
a thing as right and wrong in passing from one measure to the 
other; but what is the reality that 'right' accords with here? 
Presumably a convention, or a use, and perhaps our practical 
requirements" (Wittgenstein, 1956:3-4e and 6e). 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy of mathematics is much 
less simple than it could seem at first sight. In fact, if in a 
certain sense it may seem that any sort of foundation of 
mathematical truth relies on actual use of mathematical pro-
cedures, and that in turn the only root of their correctness is 
previous conventional agreement on this use itself, such that 
a different historical development could have produced a 
different set of mathematical truths and procedures, on the 
other side such a wholly and merely "conventionalistic" in-
terpretation of Wittgenstein's later point of view should not 
be supported. 
In fact, Wittgenstein's appeal to convention and use as the 
grounds for logical and mathematical necessity is quite expli-
cit, but Wittgenstein's notion of convention, contrary to 
Dummet's (I966) reading of it, is not the result of either a 
subjective or an arbitrary decision. Convention is not an ab-
stract and theoretical choice of some rules as those which we 
agree to follow before starting the game. The convention, the 
use from which the rules of our language-game derive, are 
actually produced within the form of life in which that lan-
guage-game is employed. The influence that the form of life 
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exerts on the prevalence of one or the other rule is a deter-
mining factor. 
Nonetheless, there still remains a certain obscurity in 
some of Wittgenstein's remarks as for the process of produc-
tion of this convention itself. The problem is that of under-
standing whether the pragmatic and behavioristic foundation 
of all linguistic activities was able, in Wittgenstein's account, 
to justify thoroughly the actual working of language. That is, 
through the new notions of "form of life" and "language-
game" did he really succeed in ruling out any appeal to sup-
posedly deeper, undefinable roots of our agreement on what 
we call "logical truth"? 
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